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In this short essay, Professor Underwood addresses an important
development in the law dealing with eyewitness testimony and the New
Jersey case ofState v. Henderson. He gets at the subject by looking back
to a 1950s television play starring fellow Kentucky resident, William
Shatner. However, in this particular instance, William Shatner would
not change the world.'
"You say again you are quite sure that it was the prisoner?"
The witness was quite sure.
"Did you ever see anybody very like the prisoner?"
Not so like (the witness said) as that he could be mistaken.
"Look well upon that gentleman, my learned friend there," pointing to
him [co-counsel] who had tossed the paper over [containing a hint for his
Leader], "and then look well upon the prisoner. How say you? Are they very
like each other?"
My Lord inquired of Mr. Stryver (the prisoner's counsel), whether they
were next to try Mr. Carton (name of my learned friend) for treason? But,
Mr. Stryver replied to my Lord, no; but he would ask the witness to tell him
whether what happened once, might happen twice; whether he would have
been so confident if he had seen this illustration of his rashness sooner,
whether he would be so confident, having seen it; and more. The upshot
of which was, to smash this witness like a crockery vessel, and shiver his
part of the case to useless lumber.'
In cases such as this, where the question of guilt or innocence hangs
entirely on the reliability and accuracy of an in-court identification, the
identification procedure should be as lacking in inherent suggestiveness as
possible. Yet that is often not the case. When asked to point to the [per-
petrator], an identification witness-particularly if he has some familiarity
with courtroom procedure-is quite likely to look immediately at the counsel
I B.S. (1969), The Ohio State University; J.D. (1976), The Ohio State University
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How William Shatner Changed the World (Discovery Channel Canada television
broadcastNov. 13, 2005) (a two-hour documentary discussing how the television series
Star Trek inspired today's technologies).
2 CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 89-90 (1902) (1859).
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table, where the defendant is conspicuously seated in relative isolation. Thus
[sic] the usual physical setting of a trial may itself provide a suggestive
setting for an eyewitness identification.3
Memory belongs to the imagination. Human memory is not like a
computer that records things; it is part of the imaginative process, on the
same terms as invention.
Introduction
I am a professor, so here is a "hypothetical" for you.
The defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314' for caus-
ing the interstate transportation of counterfeit securities. Several of the
securities in question were forged money orders that a "John Harrison"
deposited in the Flatbush Savings Bank in Brooklyn. When several of
the money orders returned unpaid, the FBI got involved. Agents obtained
a photo of the defendant and arrested him. They showed the defendant's
photo, along with seventeen other photos, to employees of the bank who
identified the defendant as the "John Harrison" who cashed the money
orders (an out-of-court identification that may have been suggestive).
Almost three years later, and just a few weeks before trial, the witnesses
again made a photographic identification of defendant (another out-of
court identification that may have been suggestive). At the trial, four
witnesses gave in-court identifications by going through the do-you-see-
the-defendant-in-court-today routine (hint-he is in the defendant's chair
next to the lawyer).'
3 Morton v. Commonwealth, No. 1554-91-2, 1993 WL 40849, at *3 (Va. Ct. App.
Feb. 9, 1993) (Benton, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d
1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
912 (1971).
4 ROBYN M. DAWEs, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 106 (1988)
(quoting Interview by Shusha Guppy with Alain Robbe-Grillet, Author, in Paris,
France (Spring 1986) (transcript available at http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/
28 19/the-art-of-fiction-no-91 -alain-robbegrillet)).
'18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2013).
6 The defendant moved to waive his presence in the courtroom, citing FEDERAL
RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 43, which provides for the trial to proceed although
the defendant absconds. Nice try, but motion denied.
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One of the witnesses, a bank teller, said that she had seen "John
Harrison" at the bank on three or four times different occasions for five
or ten minutes each. She said he was about twenty-five years of age and
about six feet tall. The following transpired:
The Court: Are you sure that is the gentleman?
Witness: I am sure.
Defense Counsel: Were there any physical characteristics of Mr. Harrison
that you remember?
Prosecutor: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: Sustained.
Witness: I'm sorry?
The Court: Don't answer, please. I sustained the objection to the question.
Defense Counsel: How did Mr. Harrison comb his hair?
Prosecutor: Objection.
The Court: Sustained. She said she is positive that is the man that she
understood to be Mr. Harrison. She is positive about it.
Defense Counsel: Were there any-was he wearing glasses at the time you
saw him in the bank?
Prosecutor: Objection.
The Court: Sustained.
Defense Counsel: Did you ever have any conversation with this John
Harrison in the bank?
Witness: No, not that I remember.
Defense Counsel: Did he ever say anything to you?
Prosecutor: Your Honor-
The Court: Did he ever what?
Defense Counsel: Say anything to you?
Prosecutor: I'm going to object to that. Just answer-
The Court: Sustained.
Defense Counsel: Did you ever say anything to John Harrison?
Prosecutor: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: Sustained. She stated she had no conversation. She can't
remember any conversation.
A bank officer also testified that he had seen "John Harrison" in the
bank twice. On the first occasion, he saw "John Harrison" in the bank
for about five minutes from twelve to fifteen feet away. On the second
occasion, he saw him in the bank for about two minutes from approxi-
mately twenty feet. He identified the defendant as the "John Harrison"
that he saw in the bank. He also testified that "John Harrison" did not
wear glasses when he was in the bank.
2013] 131
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Here again is the cross-examination.
Defense Counsel: For how long a period of time, if you added it together,
would you say that you observed this gentleman, Harrison?
Prosecutor: Now, your Honor-
Witness: Seven minutes, maybe, all together.
The Court: All right.
Defense Counsel: Did that seven minutes give you any particular impres-
sion of Mr. Harrison?
Witness: Well, I wanted to-
Defense Counsel: No. Did it give you any particular impression-
The Prosecutor: Your Honor, I object.
The Court: Sustained.
Witness: I wanted to see-
The Court: No. Don't answer, please.
Witness: I'm sorry.
The Court: I have sustained the objection. We have had the witness's
testimony respecting the two occasions that he saw him, one, when he
was about twenty feet away, and one when he was about twelve or
fifteen feet away, when he was at the window. He observed him on
one other occasion for about five minutes.
Those pesky defense lawyers-always wasting time! The witnesses
pointed to the right chair. Let us move along now.
It should come as no surprise that this was not at all "hypothetical."
The question-and-answer is real-from United States v. Fitzpatrick.7 The
court reversed the defendant's conviction because of the issues with
identification: the witnesses each testified only that they saw "Mr.
Harrison" at the bank on a few, very brief occasions from a distance or
through a teller's window; there was a thirty-month delay between the
arrest and trial; and a second photo identification session between the
prosecution and the witnesses occurred only weeks before the trial.' The
prosecutor's objections were groundless, and the trial court unfairly and
"unreasonably curtailed" the cross-examination.9 The appellate judges
waxed eloquent on the unreliability ofmuch of the eyewitness testimony,
citing the Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Wade,"o Edwin
' 437 F.2d 19, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1970).
8 Fitzpatrick, 437 F.2d at 21-22, 25.
' Id. at 21.
'n 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967).
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Borchard's classic Convicting the Innocent," a number of celebrated
cases of misidentification,12 and even Lloyd Paul Stryker's comments
from The Art ofAdvocacy.13
Cases of mistaken identity are always difficult, and yet I believe that had
a great advocate been there [referring to the case of Bertram Campbell], he
would have cross-examined those identifying witnesses so as to search their
consciences and even their souls. He would have shaken them as a terrier
throws fear into a rat. Their smug assurance would have vanished; their
complacent certainty would have weakened, and perhaps, who knows, they
might have been forced to recant their false identification on the witness
stand, even as they did seven years later [in the case he was discussing].14
Eyewitnesses are crucial prosecution witnesses who testify in about
a quarter of all cases," but eyewitness identifications made under
stressful conditions after a limited period of observation are not very
reliable. "
1 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1932).
2 Id.; see Fitzpatrick, 437 F.2d at 23-24 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 228) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ("The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known;
the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. . . . The
hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the
records of English and American trials.").
" Fitzpatrick, 437 F.2d at 24-25.
14 LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY: A PLEA FOR THE RENAISSANCE
OF THE TRIAL LAWYER 203 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., Gryphon spec. ed. 2007).
" SEYMOUR WISHMAN, ANATOMY OF A JURY 178 (1986); see ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9-10 (1979) (describing a study in which the
conviction rate for mock jurors rose fifty percent when an eyewitness identification was
provided to them, even though the eyewitness had extremely poor vision).
6 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 45-50 (2011). Garrett's book describes the ordeal of a man
named Habib Abdal, who was convicted based solely on eyewitness testimony despite
changing accounts of the story-saying "his photo looked the closest"-and stark
differences between the witness' description and Abdal's physical characteristics. Id.
Abdal spent sixteen years in prison before he was exonerated by DNA testing in 1999.
Id.; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451,
452 (2012) (quoting Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981)) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("It is all too obvious who the defendant is, sitting at counsel's table. Yet,
as Justice William Brennan wrote, '[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a
live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 'That's
the one!"'); Edward Connors et al., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
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Some courts allow psychologists to testify about the specific capacities of
witnesses, such as whether a witness can perceive color, sounds, or distances,
but many courts have disallowed these kinds of experts because of the great
impact they can have on a jury, and the way they can effectively replace the
jury's function of determining the facts."
There is also the myth that cross-examination can deal effectively with
eyewitness testimony, assuming that the judge will give counsel sufficient
leeway to conduct an effective cross-examination.'" There have been
some changes of attitude, but change has come slowly.'9 Furthermore,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 34-76 (1996) (descriptions of
defendants exonerated by DNA evidence).
"7 WISHMAN, supra note 15, at 179.
8 See Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identifi-
cations, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REv. 727, 728-29 (2007)
(noting that counsel's attempts to discredit erroneous eyewitness testimony may prove
futile); see also James M. Doyle, No Confidence: A Step Toward Accuracy in Eye-
witness Trials, THE CHAMPION, Jan. 2001, available at http://www.nacdl.org/champion
/articles/98janOl.htm (citing R. C. L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells, & Fergus J. O'Connor,
Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and
Extension, 13 LAW & HUM.BEHAV. 333, 335-37 (1989)) ("Wrong and impeached, the
confident eyewitness will probably be believed, and hundreds of innocent defendants
will be convicted as a result.... [E]xperienced lawyers don't seem to be any better at
improving this situation than do third-year law students."). Doyle's article is an
excellent discussion of the problem and provides good tactical advice. See also JAM ES
M. DOYLE & ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
229-30 (LEXIS Law Publishing 3d ed. 1997) (emphasizing the importance of a strong
cross-examination of an eyewitness).
" See Doyle, supra note 18 ("Since Manson v. Braithwraite, only a tiny portion of
eyewitness identifications are suppressed"). Kentucky will now admit expert testimony
regarding factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness testimony. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.W.3d 485,491 (Ky. 2002) ("Thus, the particular facts
of this case . . . make exclusion of [the expert's] testimony . . . an abuse of discre-
tion."), rev'g Nos. 1998-CA-003025-MR, 1998-CA-003026-MR, 2000 WL 968069
(Ky. Ct. App. July 14, 2000); see also George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State
Standards for the Admission of Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitnesses,
39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 109, 114-15, 120, 124-26, 129-32 (2011) (discussing how the
courts frequently rely on cross-examination and "cautionary jury instructions" in place
of expert eyewitness testimony); Maureen Stoneman, United States v. Smith: An
Example to Other Courts for How They Should Approach Eyewitness Experts, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 533, 544-46, 552, 561 (2011) (discussing the effect of cross-
examination on eyewitness testimony); Lauren Tallent, Through the Lens of Federal
Evidence Rule 403: An Examination of Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony
Admissibility in the Federal Circuit Courts, 68 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 765,775-77,790,
792, 801 (2011) (same).
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in-court identifications are treated as little more than theater, or manda-
tory ritual, although they can have a considerable effect on the jury. The
trial judge will allow the play to go forward as a matter, of course.
Indeed, even if a pre-trial identification has been found to be unduly
suggestive, a trial judge may still permit an in-court identification to be
made if he or she concludes that the in-court identification has an origin
in an independent source.20 What is a lawyer to do?
Looking Backward
Back in the late 1940s and 1950s, Westinghouse Studio One presented
live theater on television.2 1 The live presentations in New York City were
preserved in "Kinescope."22 A recording camera was pointed at the TV
screen as the play was acted out, and then that filmed version of the live
show was used to present the play in the other time zones.2 3 In 1957,
Ralph Bellamy2 4 and two new actors, Steve McQueen and William
Shatner, appeared in a play called The Defender.25 McQueen, a butcher's
delivery boy, was being tried for the murder of a psychiatrist's wife.2 6
20 Garrett, supra note 16, at 465; see, e.g., II GA. P. Criminal Procedure § 25:63
(2013) (citing Anderson v. State, 716 S.E.2d 813, 737-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)). The
routine allowance of the in-court identification, made long after the fact and in the most
suggestive of circumstances, seems odd in light of FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE
801(d)(1)(c), which admits a prior identification as non-hearsay on the theory that a
prior identification would be more reliable than the in-court identification, being made
closer to the events in question.
21 Studio One, ARCHIVE OF AMERICAN TELEVISION, http://www.emmytviegends
.org/interviews/shows/studio-one (last visited July 19, 2013).
22 Larry Wild, Television: History and Production, N. ST. UNIv., http://www3
.northern.edu/wild/th I 00/tv.htm (last updated June 26, 2013).
23 Id.
2" Younger readers will remember him as Randolph Duke in the insipid but award-
winning and profitable Eddy Murphy movie called "Trading Places."- TRADING
PLACES (Paramount Pictures 1983). The irony of the title "Trading Places" will not be
lost on the "hipsters" among you.
25 THE DEFENDER (Columbia Broadcasting System 1957). Clips from the 1957
show were included in an episode of Boston Legal: Son of the Defender (David E.
Kelly Productions 2007). In this silly episode, the son of the murdered woman comes
back from the past to terrorize the son of the old defender, again played by Shatner,
who is now a senior lawyer looking back at his career and his relationship with his
father. Id.
26 THE DEFENDER, supra note 25.
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Bellamy played the lawyer appointed to represent him and was assisted
by his son, played by Shatner.27 As the trial turned more and more
against the defendant, the senior defender was finally persuaded by the
younger to switch a somewhat look-alike law student for the defendant.28
That is, the "ringer" sat at counsel table and the defendant was secreted
in the spectators' gallery.29 This led the critical eyewitnesses to misiden-
tify the student as the defendant.3 0 In a dramatic scene, Bellamy reveals
the ruse by presenting the defendant and the student to the jury.1
Exactly what the prosecutors were doing while all this was set up is
not clear-studying their briefs or fiddling with their ties, perhaps. Al-
though the judge criticized the defenders3 2 for their tactics, he (unrealisti-
cally) directed the acquittal of the defendant.3 3 Prosecution-oriented
viewers would decry the cheap trick. The older defense lawyer, who is
a bit stodgy for my taste, was left to wonder if justice was done and at
what price.34 My guess is that most viewers liked the result and thought
they were watching real "lawyer stuff." One wonders how many lawyers
watched the show and how many were inspired by it to try the old
"switcheroo." '
Of course, the few law students who will read this little Article have
taken, or will soon take, a course in Professional Responsibility and will
know not to try this trick at home. I should also point out that the A Tale
of Two Cities scenario did not involve the switcheroo, but rather an
27 Id.
28 Id. If you watch the play, you will see that at one point the psychiatrist loses it
and attacks the defendant, punching and then strangling him. Id. That was exactly
what was done to the murder victim. Id. Does that not suggest another possible





32 Id. The judge in A Tale of Two Cities was also hostile. "My Lord being prayed
to bid my learned friend lay aside his wig, and giving no very gracious consent, the
likeness became much more remarkable." DICKENS, supra note 2, at 90 (emphasis
added). As I note later on, judges have tended to be rather cavalier about in-court
identification evidence and tend to be unsympathetic toward defense requests for





opportunistic courtroom demonstration that involved no deception at all.35
The second seat counsel for the defense just happened to bear a striking
resemblance to the defendant, and most everyone was too dense or
otherwise occupied to notice it until the second seat, Mr. Carton, decided
to get involved in the case and passed a note suggesting the demonstration
to his senior.3 ' How often will that opportunity present itself?
Having so confidently predicted that today's generation will not try
this trick, I have to backtrack just a bit. There are more cases involving
the switcheroo out there than you might think. Let the fun begin!
The Cases
Many lawyers, and a few professors, for that matter, wonder what was
so "wrong" about the switcheroo. In that regard the case ofKentucky Bar
Association v. Taylor" is worth a read. I was in Vietnam when this was
happening. I was not a lawyer then. The case has a bit of age on it.
Taylor was in hot water for a lot of reasons.3 8 His attempted
switcheroo was only a blip in the lengthy indictment by the watchdogs
of the bar.39 He was ultimately reprimanded and suspended for a
" DICKENS,supra note 2, at 89-90. One might profitably compare the facts ofJones
v. State, 695 P.2d 13, 15-16 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), which provides us with a
variation that does not appear in the legal ethics casebooks. In Jones, the prosecution
witness identified the defendant's brother, who was seated at the defense table with the
defendant. Id. at 16. The trial judge mistakenly viewed this as a "ringer" case and
allowed the state to attempt rehabilitation of the witness by admitting the witness's
prior extrajudicial identification. Id. (citing Miskovsky v. State ex. rel. Jones, 586 P.2d
1104, 1106-1110 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978)). The appellate court ruled that this was not
a case involving the "substitution" ofa "ringer," and further ruled that where a witness
incorrectly identifies the defendant in court, evidence of a prior extrajudicial
identification is inadmissible to rehabilitate (an interesting ruling?). Id. (citing Hill v.
State, 500 P.2d 1075, 1077-79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972)). Many courts will admit a
prior identification when an eyewitness cannot positively identify the defendant in
court. See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 522 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting
Hatcher v. State, 334 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)).
3 DICKENS, supra note 2, at 89-90. Presumably the reader will remember that, in
the end, Sidney Carton's likeness to the defendant takes a rather unfortunate turn, at
least for Carton. Id. at 454.
3' 482 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1972).
31 Taylor, 482 S.W.2d at 578-82.
3 Id. at 579.
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relatively short time, but not for the trick that interests us.40 Turning to
the facts of his case, it seems that when his client's case was called, he
"moved to the area in front of the [judge's] bench, accompanied by a
young man." At this point "Officer Bramble, the prosecuting witness,"
saw at once that the young man accompanying him "was not the defen-
dant," and alerted the prosecutor.42 The judge overheard the discussions
and "asked [the defense attorney] if this was the defendant on trial."43
Taylor, the defense attorney, responded evasively with something like
"'we are ready for trial"' or "'he is in the courtroom.'" 4 He did not
answer directly but also did not represent that the young man "was the
defendant."45 In any event, whatever Taylor had planned did not
happen.46 The judge ordered the defendant to come forward.47 He did,
and the case was tried.48 While the Bar attempted to punish Taylor for
all of this, the judge was not all that helpful.49 The judge testified that,
although "he 'did not like' what had happened," he did not think it was
necessarily improper.o From the reported opinion:
Q-With regard to the charge that Mr. Taylor entered a substitute
defendant in your court, at any time during the episode that took place on
that particular day, did you come up with the impression or the conclusion
that Mr. Taylor was trying to perpetrate a fraud on your court?
A-No, I didn't. As a matter of fact I had the opposite conclusion. Had
I thought he was trying to perpetrate a fraud on my court I would have put
him in jail right then for contempt.
Q-What was his purpose?
A-I don't know. I can only guess and assume that he was trying to
confuse the prosecution witness from the standpoint of the definity (sic) of
the defendant. That is what I assumed at the time.
40 Id. at 584.







41 Id. at 579.




Q-At any time-incidentally how long have you known Mr. Taylor?
A-Well, 15 years, I assume.
Q-Well, at any time since you have been on the bench with the
exception oftactics, such as what we're talking in this matter, have you ever
had any occurrence or anything that would ever make you question the ethics
of Mr. Taylor either as a lawyer or a human being?
A-No, I have never questioned Mr. Taylor's honor or integrity. As you
mentioned I have questioned his tactics. I have had my problems with Mr.
Taylor and I held him in contempt of court on probably two or three
occasions on tactics. Not for fraud or misrepresentation or lying or anything
else. I have never had any question. As a matter of fact I think he is an
honest man and a man of integrity."
The wig for the bar association was not exactly having a perfect hair
day, I would say. The Kentucky court found that the conduct in question
did not warrant discipline.5 2 There are some lessons here, I suppose. You
will probably get caught. It probably will not work. Make sure you do
not make any direct misrepresentations.
Now let us fast-forward to 1981 and the leading case-the case that
all of the subsequent cases have followed in somewhat knee-jerk fashion.
That case is the one that appears in all of the ethics casebooks, United
States v. Thoreen."
Well, perhaps we should not move forward quite that fast. In 1966,
the American Bar Association (ABA) looked at defense tactics in
criminal cases in Informal Opinion 914.54 I suspect that not many
lawyers tracked ABA informal opinions in those days, but you can
retrieve them from several sources." I must say that this opinion is a bit
odd. The question posed (perhaps by a prosecutor, but we do not know
from the opinion 6) was whether a defense lawyer had acted improperly
" Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Id. at 583.
5' 653 F.2d 1332, 1336-43 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
54 ABA Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Informal Op. 914 (1966).
" See ABA Comm. on Prof' Ethics, Informal Ops. C230(a)-866 (1975); 0. MARU,
1980 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONs (1982); 0.
MARU, 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS
(1972).
5 In Kentucky, where I was chairman of the Ethics Committee for fourteen years,
the committee will not issue advisory opinions unless the requestor is asking about his
own conduct. We do not want to supply ex parte ammunition for someone to use
against an opponent.
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when he called four boys before the court knowing that three of the four
were not the true defendants.17 A jury was sworn 'only to qualifica-
tion. ""' As the advocates were given a list of the jurors for voir dire, two
cops told the prosecutor "'that they couldn't identify three of the four
defendants' (again, you will probably get caught).59 During a delay
sought by the prosecution, the four boys left.6 0 Later the true defendants
came into the courtroom.6' Defense counsel then asked for a continuance,
which was granted.6 2 .[D]efense counsel never made any statements
[as to who were the true defendants], and the jury had not been sworn
to try that particular case.'"' The opinion continues:
We must assume that the lawyer was responsible for bringing the four
individuals into court, when he knew that three of them were not the true
defendants. We also must assume that this was a trick to mislead the court
and jury. It is not clear, however, what advantage the lawyer sought to
obtain. Certainly an acquittal of the three individuals who were not the true
defendants would not preclude a subsequent trial of the true defendants.64
The committee seemed somewhat baffled by the whole thing, and
noted that it presented a question of "first impression."" On the other
hand, the committee members were certain that the lawyer had been
unethical. 6 The Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility had not yet
been enacted, but the ABA model oath of admission to the bar promised
that the lawyer would "'never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any
artifice,"" and Canon 15" of the old Canons said that a lawyer should











61 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 15 (1980).
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not engage in "any manner of fraud or chicane."" The conclusion from
this somewhat limited analysis was that "if the evidence in a disciplinary
proceeding established that the lawyer participated in any way in the
substitution of other persons for the true defendants, such would
constitute unethical conduct" 7o-end of conversation.
So now for Thoreen." This case arose from charges of criminal
contempt against a fisherman named Sibbett, who was one of over 240
fishermen who had violated an injunction against salmon fishing-not
exactly the crime of the century.7 2 Thoreen, the defense lawyer, hoped
that the agent who gave Sibbett a citation for salmon fishing would not
be able to identify him in court.7 3 Thoreen substituted another man who
closely resembled Sibbett at the counsel table as if he were the defendant
and even dressed him in outdoor gear-denims, clunky shoes, a plaid
shirt, and a jacket-vest.7 4 Thoreen placed the real defendant behind the
bar in an area where the press usually sat and dressed him in a suit and
"large round glasses."" Thoreen did this without the court's permission
or notifying the prosecution.76 The court ordered a separation of
9 Id.; ABA Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Informal Op. 914 (1966).
7 ABA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Informal Op. 914 (1966).
" Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1336-43.
72 Id. at 1336.
7 Id.
74 Id.
7 Id.; Let us play dress up. On the games we play, see a particularly amusing
anecdote from STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 236, 244 (2005). This was the scene during the
trial ofa young woman who was charged with and convicted of murdering a cab driver:
There's a pen in her hand, a legal pad on the table in front of her. Her pigtails
frame a bright-eyed, cherubic face. Winnie the Pooh, hunched above one breast
pocket of her jumper, is gazing at the clutch of balloons above the other breast
pocket. [She] also has on a white blouse, crew socks stretched halfway up her
calves, and green tennis shoes.... She was sixteen when she shot the cabbie in the
head with the 357.
Before the trial, [the defense lawyer] asked [the judge] to bar the state from
introducing any testimony or evidence regarding a certain tattoo on [her] calf.
[Defense counsel] knew the state had a photo of the tattoo, taken when [she] was
jailed. "To put it bluntly, Judge, it's a hand holding a penis .... "
Id. at 236, 244.
" Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1336.
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witnesses (exclusion from the courtroom) but the ringer did not move. 77
As the trial progressed, Thoreen motioned to the ringer as if he was the
defendant, had him take notes on the obligatory notepad, and did not
correct the court when it referred to the ringer as the defendant.78 So, we
have misrepresentation here, right? The ruse "worked" this time, and
during the trial two of the Government's witnesses misidentified the
ringer as the defendant.7 9 Thoreen then called the real defendant as a
witness." The court called a recess and then allowed the Government
to reopen its case so that the government agent who had cited Sibbett for
two of the violations could identify him correctly."'
Thoreen had fallen into a trap of his own making. This was a pure
switcheroo, and there was misrepresentation.82 The issue was clearly
n Id.
7 Id. We all fall for the note-taking bit, do we not? See HENRY BEARD, O.J.'s
LEGALPAD: WHAT Is REALLY GOING ON IN O.J.'s MIND? (1995) (a fictional parody of
the notes that O.J. Simpson took during his trial).
" Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1336.
80 Id. at 1336-37.
" Id. at 1337.
82 Id. at 1336. In a short article, Barry Tarlow covers some of the same ground I am
covering. See Barry Tarlow, Too Clever by Half The Switcheroo with a Twist, THE
CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=1228
(available by subscription only). Tarlow emphasizes the importance of misrepresenta-
tions as a critical factor in these cases. Id. He cites the interesting case of Kiner v.
State of Indiana, in which a defense lawyer falsely represented that a photograph was
of the defendant to get the witness to misidentify the person in the photo as the
defendant. 643 N.E.2d 950, 952-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied. This is but a
variation on our theme. The trial judge was critical of the tactic, citing the Thoreen line
of cases. Kiner, 643 N.E.2d at 953. 1 mention the case because the court also cited my
favorite author (me). Id. (citing RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE,
TRIAL ETHICS § 11.8, at 333-34 (1988)). Cf People v. Simac, 641 N.E.2d 416, 421-
422 (Ill. 1994) (upholding a direct criminal contempt conviction when the court found
intent to obstruct the court through sufficient evidence that the defense counsel
substituted an individual who looked similar to the defendant, did not notify the court,
and ultimately caused a misidentification by the prosecution's witness), reh 'g denied.
The majority in Simac followed Thoreen. Id. at 424. Dissenting, Justice Nickels
argued that "placing an individual in the defendant's customary place at counsel's
table, without more, is a sufficient basis from which to infer an intent to hinder or
obstruct" justice, or "impugn the integrity of the court." Id. at 424 (Nickels, J., dis-
senting). He distinguished the case from Thoreen, noting that at no time did counsel
engage in misrepresentation. Id. at 426-27. Also, the record did not reflect that any
motion to exclude witnesses was made at the beginning of the trial. Id. at 426.
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framed-no exit this time. Would the court have mercy and consider this
as an effort to "find the truth," albeit by way of a bit of trickery? I do not
know if Judge Tanner had ever seen The Defender, but he was neither
impressed nor amused." He came down hard on Thoreen, holding him
in criminal contempt.8 4 He held that Thoreen's conduct violated several
sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility." The custom was
that "only counsel, parties, and others having court permission could sit
forward of the rail."86 Moreover, the court reasoned that the separation
order applied to the ringer." The judge also threw in a citation to
Informal Opinion 914." Thoreen was ultimately held in criminal con-
tempt.89
A defense attorney has no obligation to assist the State by alerting an identification
witness as to defendant's location. . . . In light of the seriousness of allowing an
identification based only upon defendant's placement in the courtroom, defense
counsel acted in good faith and on behalf of his client. Such conduct is insufficient
to support a charge of contempt.
Id. (citing People v. Miller, 281 N.E.2d 292, 294 (Ill. 1972)).
Mention of Kiner also gives me an excuse to mention Doe v. Boland, in which a
lawyer expert witness acting as a defense expert used actual children's images to
demonstrate how computers could transform innocent pictures into child porn. 630
F.3d491,493-94(6thCir.2011),cert.denied,2013 WL497568(June 17,2013). This
tactic was a bad idea because he was manufacturing child porn in violation of the law.
Doe, 630 F.3d at493-94. He got himself sued under the civil penalty provisions of the
child pornography statute. Id.; see Lora v. Boland, 825 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906-907
(N.D. Ohio 2011) ($300,000 judgment!), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Boland, 2013
WL 497568 (June 17, 2013). "Boland could have [adequately] accomplished the
purpose of his testimony without creating child pornography using images of real
minors. He could have either used fictitious (e.g., computer-generated) images of
children, or pictures of real adults . . . ." Lora, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13 (emphasis
added). Further comment would be superfluous.
" Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1342-43; see THE DEFENDER, supra note 25.
84 Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1337.
" Id. at 1338 (citing WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-102(A)(4), 7-
102(A)(6), 7-1 06(C)(5) (1979) (discussing fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, creation
of false evidence, and failure to comply with known local customs of courtesy)).
" Id. at 1341.
8 Id.
" Id. at 1340 (citing ABA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Informal Op. 914 (1966)).
89 Id. at 1342. For a similar case that resulted in an eighteenth-month suspension
from the practice, see In re Gross, 759 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Mass. 2001). Cf. Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488, 492 (Md. 1991) (misrepresentation of
client identity to agent conducting presentence investigation). For more on advocacy
2013] 143
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
So there we have it. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.90 Once you have a
big, old precedent like this, you can bet that everyone else will follow
suit. That is what happened.9 1 Lawyers who have repeated Thoreen's
conduct were bench-slapped. In City ofPortsmouth, Ohio v. Alexander,92
the defendant was convicted of petty larceny from a grocery store.9 3
"Unbeknown to the trial court or the prosecution, [defendant's] counsel
had requested [defendant's] sister to sit at counsel table with [defendant]
being seated in the back row of the spectator section. The officers in their
testimony identified the sister as the person they observed at the store and
arrested."94 After the prosecution rested, the defense lawyer called the
sister to disclose the misidentification, then called two character wit-
nesses, and then rested." After a continuance, the defendant was ordered
to sit at counsel table, and the prosecution was allowed to introduce three
new witnesses to identify the defendant." When counsel for the defense
asked to call additional witnesses, "the court restricted [additional
testimony] to the identification issue only."97 On appeal, the defense
argued that it should have been allowed to offer these additional
witnesses, but the appellate court upheld the trial judge's limitation on
the basis that the additional evidence was not "newly discovered or
and contempt, see Ronald Rychlak, Direct Criminal Contempt and the Trial Attorney:
Constitutional Limitations on the Contempt Power, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 245
(1990) (arguing that "clarify[ing] the law of direct criminal contempt and suggest[ing]
guidelines which can provide practitioners with a general knowledge about contempt");
Louis Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt-Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of Con-
tempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 WASH. L. REV. 743, 743
(1990) (arguing that "any standard for defining contempt that is less restrictive than
actual obstruction or the imminent threat of obstruction would be unconstitutionally
overbroad").
90 Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1342-43.
" See Simac, 641 N.E.2d at 423-24; Miskovsky v. Okla. ex rel. Jones, 586 P.2d
1104, 1106-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); James A. Francque, People v. Simac: How
Much Is Too Much Advocacy?, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 793, 804-15 (1995) (discussing
courts' treatment of this issue).
92 No. 1454, 1984 WL 5611 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1984).
9 Alexander, 1984 WL 5611, at *1.
94 Id.
9 Id.
96 Id. at *I- 2.
9 Id. at *2.
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unavailable" for the defense's case-in-chief." The defense was stuck
with its election." Again, the defense fell into its own pit.'" Thoreen
was cited by the court in support of the outcome.' 0
United States v. Sabater0 2 followed the same pattern. The defendant
was charged with selling crack cocaine.'o3 After a police officer's direct
examination, counsel substituted defendant's sister for the defendant and
had her wear the blue-striped blazer that defendant wore during the
9 Id.
9 Id.
"o "He that diggeth a pit shall fall into it . . . ." Ecclesiastes 10:8; Proverbs 26:27;
Psalms 7:5, 57:6. For a really interesting case involving the consequences of the
"switcheroo," see State v. Rogers, 2007 WL 3071182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct.
23, 2007) (per curiam). In this case, the defense lawyer tried the same lame trick,
substituting defendant's brother for the defendant. Id. at *2. Predictably, the prose-
cution saw it coming and the plan could not be carried out (again, you will probably
be caught). Id. However, the court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the
defendant about the plan and destroy his credibility. Id.
Q. Yesterday, it is true, sir, that you tried to switch clothes with another person
in the courtroom here to attempt to deceive either the officers o[r] the jury?
A. Not the jury, but the officers.Q. So you attempted to switch clothes with who?
A. My brother.Q. And you were going to . . . have him try to come up here and deceive
somebody?
A. No. I wasjust going to sit in the back and see if the officers really knew who
I was.Q. But you changed your mind?
A. Yes.Q. How far did you get? Did you actually give him your jacket and pants?
A. Yes.Q. Was he actually sitting in the court at one point in time dressed like that?
A. No.Q. How far did you get?
A. Outside the door.
Id. During redirect of the defendant, the defendant's counsel tried to establish that the
plan was the idea of the defense counsel and the defendant was not at fault. Id. The
prosecution objected and the trial judge sustained the objection! Id. "Without explana-
tion, the judge concluded that the cross-examination of defendant on this point had not
prejudiced him." Id. at *3. The appellate division held that counsel's ill-conceived
plan was ineffective assistance of counsel, and that it "so damaged [the] defendant's
credibility as to deny him a fair trial." Id. For another case in which the "switcheroo"
cost the client dearly while the lawyers walked away, see Tarlow, supra note 82.
101 Alexander, 1984 WL 5611, at *3.
102 830 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1987).
"o Sabater, 830 F.2d at 8.
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officer's direct. 10 4 The defendant was seated in the back of the court-
room."os The officer was then asked during cross if he saw the same
people in the courtroom.'0 6
Asked "Where are they?" the witness replies, "Seated at the [defense]
table."
"Is that both the people you are talking about?"
"Yes."
Defense counsel then asks the court "to take recognition" that the police
officer had not identified his client. 07
The trial judge then ordered a recess to discuss what had happened.o
Expressing the view that he "'would almost label [counsel's conduct]
unethical'" (he was not impressed by defense counsel's claim that he had
done it before in other trials), "[h]e ruled that he would place the
defendant and her sister together and would then direct [the officer] to
make an identification."l 09 He also informed the jury that a substitution
had previously been made by defense counsel."0 "No objection was
made to [the judge's] statement.""' Defense counsel belatedly argued
on appeal that the sister still had the blazer on, which allowed the jury
to infer from the officer's earlier testimony on cross and the judge's
clarifying statements to the jury that it was still the sister and not the
defendant who wore the blazer." 2 However, it was too late to argue that
on appeal.
The appellate court opined:
"When a defendant is sufficiently aware in advance that identification
testimony will be presented at trial and fears irreparable suggestivity, as was









112 Id. at 10.
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identification witness will first view the suspect with others of like descrip-
tion rather than in the courtroom sitting alone at the defense table."
"A fairly short delay of proceedings was all that would have been
required to rearrange the seating in the courtroom and to secure the presence
of some people of the defendant's approximate age and skin color. While
it was not necessary for the court to conduct a true Wade-type of lineup,
these relatively minor steps were required to ensure that the identification
was not unfair."" 3
That sounds pretty good at first, but have judges really been open to
in-court line-ups?"14 Furthermore, how effective can an in-court line-up
be once everyone knows what is happening?"' Regarding the first
1' Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir.), reh 'g denied, 756 F.2d 223 (2d
Cir. 1984)) (referencing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)).
114 See, e.g., Hartsfield v. State, 722 P.2d 717, 719-20. (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)
(holding there was no true question of identity, so the defendant was not entitled to sit
somewhere in the courtroom other than at the defense table).
'" See United States ex rel. Littlejohn v. Lefevre, No. 93 CIV. 3416 (VLB), 1994
WL 24656, at I n. I (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1994) (citing United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d
1332 (9th Cir. 1981)) ("Advance court approval has been deemed necessary to the
propriety of [the switcheroo], although it might lead to defeating of its purpose unless
obtained through an otherwise dubious exparte request."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982). In the habeas corpus proceeding, there was a question of the reliability of an
eye-witness. Id. at * 1. The court observed that "[n]o effort [was made] to arrange any
pragmatic test of the witness's identification, such as [a] court-supervised lineup." Id.
(citing Brown, 699 F.2d at 593-94; Archibald, 734 F.2d at 942-43). The court went on
to say:
Another effective method never attempted or requested would be substituti[ng] the
person sitting at the usual defense seat at counsel table. Advance court approval has
been deemed necessary to the propriety of such procedure, although it might lead
to defeating of its purpose unless obtained through an otherwise dubious ex parte
request.
Id. at n. I. Others reject the notion:
[R]evealing [a plan for] substitution in advance [will defeat the purpose, or]
compromise the prosecutor by forcing him to choose between revealing the trick to
the state's identification witness or remaining silent and potentially losing the case
as a result.... Courts and opposing counsel routinely learn of a lawyer's tactics in
advance by way of pre-trial motions and arguments and still honor their
professional obligations to the fullest. Courts continue to rule fairly and opposing
counsel do not refer to evidence or matters that they know to be off limits.
Douglas Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and Parlor
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question, consider Morton v. Commonwealth.116 The defendant was
"charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute."'1" The
defense "filed a motion in limine requesting that the investigating officer
be required to identify the perpetrator in a non-prejudicial setting, such
as a lineup.""' The motion was denied, and his appeal based on the
denial failed."' The court of appeals gave the matter short shrift:
We know of no statutory requirement or established rule of practice which
requires a lineup on demand. Therefore, we hold that a motion for a lineup,
or for any other procedure to test a witness' ability to identify the accused,
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court in the performance of
its duty to afford a fair trial. 2 0
In a strong dissent, Judge Benton pointed out that there were grounds for
questioning the trustworthiness of this particular in-court identification,
including the fact that the defendant would produce alibi witnesses and
that the officer had given a prior inconsistent statement relating to the
defendant's appearance.' 2 ' He noted that the Commonwealth's argument
was simply that the trial court "had no authority to order a lineup" and
that the officer's testimony "would be trustworthy because the officer
would be testifying under oath."'2 2 The judge "denied the motion for a
pre-trial lineup because 'this would set an incredible precedent' and
because the officer was a trained observer.123
Citing Thoreen and other cases, the dissent pointed out that a witness's
credibility might be tested by notifying the court and counsel that
identification is at issue and seek permission to seat two or more persons
Tricks, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 3, 57-58 (2002). 1 will let the reader choose his side in
this debate.
116 No. 1554-91-2, 1993 WL 40849 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1993).
'" Morton, 1993 WL 40849, at *1.
"1 Id.
" Id.
120 Id. at *2.
121 Id. at *2-3 (Benton, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at *3 (Benton, J., dissenting).
123 Morton, 1993 WL 40849, at *3 (Benton, J., dissenting).
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at counsel table without identifying the defendant, 12 4 as was done in Jones
v. Statel2 5; have no one at counsel table; or hold an in-court lineup.126
Unfortunately, the majority's decision in this case to uphold the trial judge's
erroneous reason for denying a prehearing identification procedure further
limits the range of options available to assure that identification of a
defendant as the perpetrator is based on actual recognition by the witness
and not merely because the witness knows where the defendant will be
seated in the courtroom.127
Returning to the second question, in my opinion, lawyers on the
defense side of the "v." are entitled to be a bit skeptical of prosecutors'
willingness to play fair. Bennett Gershman has pointed to several recent
Supreme Court cases in which the testimony of key identification wit-
nesses appears to been heavily coached.128 "[T] hey provide a devastating
commentary on the artificiality of courtroom testimony by eyewit-
nesses . . . 129
Looking Forward
All of this has been fun, but what is the point? I am not expecting
courts to repudiate Thoreen. But I am suggesting-hardly an original
thought-thatjudicial attitudes toward eyewitness evidence, particularly
in court identifications, must change. Cross-examination may be rough
and sometimes over-the-top, and there may be some legitimate concern
about lawyer "tricks" (although the "tricks" seldom succeed in the real
124 Id. at *4 (Benton, J., dissenting).
125 695 P.2d 13, 16 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); see also discussion supra note 35.
126 Morton, 1993 WL 40849, at *4.
127 Id.
128 Bennett L. Gershman, The Eyewitness Conundrum: How Courts, Police and
Attorneys Can Reduce Mistakes by Eyewitnesses, 81 N.Y. ST. B. J. 24, 27 (Jan. 2009)
(citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 677, 685, 705 (2004), cert. denied sub nom.
Banks v. Thaler, 130 S. Ct. 2092 (2010); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 272-75
(1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 443, 454 n.14 (1995)).
129 Id.at 27 n.61 (citing Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland,
47 S. TEx. L. REV. 685 (2006)) ("It should be noted that the prosecutor in each of the
above cases not only engaged in impermissible witness coaching but also withheld
exculpatory evidence that would have severely discredited the witnesses' testimony.").
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world), but all of that seems to pale in significance when compared to
the devastation wrought by unreliable eyewitness testimony.
The judicial response to the problem has been a mixed bag. For many
of us, the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in Perry v. New
Hampshire'30 was a disappointment. Although the Court nodded
favorably in the direction of more expert testimony and cautionary
instructions as a partial remedy,'3 ' it reaffirmed the use of Manson v.
Braithwaite'sl32 so-called reliability indicators, one of which is witness
confidence.'3 3 However, there is an abundance of scientific evidence that
witness confidence has little correlation to the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications.'3 4 Furthermore, the Court took its eye off the reliability
ball by taking a Fourth Amendment style approach to suppression.' A
pre-admission ruling on reliability will only be required if a suggestive
pretrial identification was arranged by law enforcement.' The reasoning
is that the Due Process Clause is only implicated if government agents
were involved.3'7 The emphasis, then, is on police deterrence rather than
reliability.'38 Unnecessarily suggestive circumstances injected by other
30 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
131 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 724. I note in passing that cautionary instructions may push
jurors in the wrong direction. See Doyle, supra note 18 (discussing United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
132 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
133 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 724 (citing Manson, 432 U.S. at 107, 109, 112-13).
11" See Doyle, supra note 18.
"' Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 718-19.
136 Id. at 730. Justice Sotomayor, the only trial judge on the bench, dissented. See
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730-40. For a sample motion and memorandum of points and
authorities after Perry, see United States v. Villareal, No. 08-cr-i 332 JAH, 2012 WL
3734264 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012). The motion and memorandum also deal with the
separation and exclusion of witnesses and related problems, which are addressed in
Richard H. Underwood, Following the Rules: Exclusion of Witnesses, Sequestration,
and "No-Consultation " Orders, 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 513 (2012).
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
* See Valena Elizabeth Beety, What the Brain Saw: The Case of Trayvon Martin
and the Need for Eyewitness Identification Reform, 90 DEN. U. L. REv. 331, 345-46
(2012) (Despite the fact that jurors must weigh the reliability of eyewitness testimony,
they "generally show a poor understanding of scientific research on whether and how
eyewitness testimony is reliable."); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 731, 734
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's opinion "recasts the
driving force of our decisions as an interest in police deterrence, rather than reliability"
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witnesses or by social media will not provide a basis for suppression.139
It is worth noting, too, that suppression is rare, even when government
agents were involved. 4 0 The eyewitness identification testimony will
usually come in. Given the low probability of exclusion even when
government agents are involved, plus the continued admission of in-court
identifications under the "independent source" rule,14' Perry's approval
of expert testimony and cautionary instructions pays lip service to the
problem of wrongful convictions attributable to eyewitness testimony. 42
This brings us to the important, if not entirely satisfactory, New Jersey
case of State v. Henderson.143 The production of commentary on the
case is something of a growth industry, so my discussion of the case will
be limited.
Only a year before Perry, the New Jersey Supreme Court changed the
rules for the admission of eyewitness testimony by taking account of the
scientific research since Manson.'44 The hook for this reevaluation of
standards was the due process language of the state constitution. 14 The
court discussed a number of "estimator variables," including visibility,
age of the witness, lighting and the like, and "system variables" such as
by "categorically exempt[ing] all eyewitness identifications derived from suggestive
circumstances that were not police-manipulated-however suggestive, and however
unreliable-from our due process check.").
"' See Deborah Davis & Elizabeth Loftus, The Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the
Innocent: Learning from the Past and Projecting into the Age ofSocial Media, 46 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 769, 779-80, 783 (2012) (citing Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721).
140 See id. at 776 (citing GARRETT, supra note 16, at 77) ("[S]uppression motions
were heard for 58 of the 161 cases he reviewed, and while many of these cases entailed
manifestly unreliable witnesses and strongly suggestive identification procedures, none
of the motions for suppression were granted." (emphasis added)).
14' Garrett, supra note 16, at 476-82.
142 See id. at495-97 (quoting Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 727) ("[T]he Court blithely noted
... that 'all in-court identifications' involve 'some elements of suggestion,' identifying
this as one reason to leave the problem ofunreliable eyewitness identification evidence
to the states and to jurors.").
143 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see Evidence-Eyewitness Identifications-New Jersey
Supreme Court Uses Psychological Research to Update Admissibility Standards for
Out-of-Court Identifications-State v. Henderson, 27A.3d872 (N.J. 2011), 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1514 (2012) (proposing a standard for suppression ofeyewitness identification
based solely on reliability rather than suggestiveness).
144 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922.
145 Id. at 919 n. 10 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1).
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police procedures and police interaction.'4 6 The opinion was well
received by academics, and it generally assumed that the opinion will
encourage other state courts to introduce more stringent standards for the
admissibility of testimony tainted by unnecessarily suggestive police
procedures and police interaction.'4 7 On the other hand, the focus was
still on the conduct of government actors; and we still have the problem
ofjury overestimation of the probative value of in-court identifications.
A companion case, State v. Chen,14" is also noteworthy because the
New Jersey Supreme Court took things one step further and held that the
words and conduct of a private actor, the victim's husband, should also
be considered "highly suggestive" and justify a pre-trial hearing "to
assess the admissibility" ofhis wife's identification ofthe defendant-the
husband's former girlfriend.'49 The husband had shown the wife pictures
of the defendant to help her make her identification.'s The trial court
decided not to hold a so-called Wade hearing "because no government
officer had acted in a suggestive manner.""' Although the court stuck
to its earlier precedents holding that due process concerns were not
triggered in the absence of government conduct, the court returned to the
notion that reliability, and not just police deterrence, should be "the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." 52
A Wade hearing was not required, but the courts still have a "gatekeeping
role" to perform.'5 3 "Even if evidence has probative value [and passes
146 Id. at 895, 904-10. In other words, "estimator variables" are those that the
criminal justice system cannot control, while "system variables" are those factors that
the legal system can control. Id. at 895.
147 See Garrett, supra note 16, at 457, 488 (quoting Laurens Walker & John Mon-
ahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559
(1987)) (citing Henderson, 27 A.3d at 292-93) ("The Henderson decision in New
Jersey, while not perfect, provides a 'social science framework' for encouraging proper
lineups in the first instance, evaluating eyewitness evidence at hearings pretrial, ad-
mitting them in court, and instructing jurors on how to weight eyewitness identifica-
tions.").
148 27 A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011).
149 Chen, 27 A.3d at 944.
ISO Id. at 932.
Id.; see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967) (requiring a hearing
regarding "whether . . . in-court identifications [have] an independent source, or
whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error").
152 Chen, 27 A.3d at 936-37 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 114).
' Id. at 937.
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the relevance test], it may still be excluded [by virtue of New Jersey
Evidence Rule 403 (like its federal counterpart)]" if the probative value
of the evidence is substantially outweighed by "'the risk of . .. undue
prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury."" 54 The court also
alluded to the requirement that the eyewitnesses' testimony be based on
their own personal knowledge (Rule 602) and "their 'opinions or
inferences' must be 'rationally based on their perception' (Rule 701).'
The court also noted New Jersey precedent for pretrial Rule 104 hearings
on the reliability of children's testimony that might have been affected
by "coercive or unduly suggestive" interrogation and "the reliability of
polygraph evidence," even when stipulated.'56 Finally, the court em-
phasized that the vast body of scientific literature cited in Henderson also
established the suggestive effects of private actors.'57 Indeed, the court
pointed to a Model Jury Charge that instructs the jury to consider the
effects of "'opinions, descriptions or identifications given by other
witnesses, . . . photographs or newspaper accounts, or .. . any other
information or influence that may have affected the independence of
his/her identification. "'" The court cited scientific literature and expert
testimony that private actors can affect witness confidence and influence
memory and recall.' The New Jersey Supreme Court took the bold step
that the United States Supreme Court was not willing to take-to
conclude that "'basic fairness' required a pretrial hearing" on admissibil-
ity "when a defendant has made a threshold showing of impermissible
suggestiveness" by a private actor. 6 0 On the other hand, the court did
hold that when there is no police action a higher initial threshold-
"evidence of highly suggestive circumstances"-must be met.'
Id. (quoting N.J. R. EVID. 403).
Id. (quoting N.J. R. EvIn. 701) (citing N.J. R. EVID. 602).
156 Id. (citing N.J. R. EVID. 104; State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1380 (N.J.
1994)).
" Id. at 938.
Id. (quoting Henderson, 27 A.3d at 907-08).
" Id. at 939 (citing C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of
Eyewitness Confidence: Co- Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
714, 714 (1994)).
16 Id. at 940.
161 Id. at 942-43.
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Conclusion
We know that eyewitness identifications are often unreliable evidence,
and we know that they have a tremendous impact on jurors. We also
know that in-court identifications are made in a particularly suggestive
context. Some courts are taking the wealth of social science research into
account and admitting expert testimony regarding the fallibility of
eyewitness identifications, and fashioningjury instructions to reflect this
research. Some are also considering procedures for testing the reliability
of eyewitness identifications made prior to trial, although the Supreme
Court decision in Perry v. New Hampshire1 62 was rather retrograde.
However, the problem of the dramatic in-court identification remains.
Even if an out-of-court identification is suppressed, what is the point if
an in-court identification is going to be allowed almost as a matter of
course under the independent source rule? Given the hostility of at least
some trial judges to pointed cross-examination and apparent concern for
lawyer "tricks," will judges consider exclusion of in-court identifications?
Will they at least give counsel more leeway in the courtroom instead of
routinely denying in-court lineups and the like under the rubric of
discretion? Are we going to continue to worry more about "tricks" than
justice?
162 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
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